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3 840 East Robinson Road - #3 18 
Amherst, NY 1~228-2001 
11 -067-18 B 
October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. · · 
Smith, Cruse, Demosthenes 
Appellant's Briefre.ceived September 23, 2019 · 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Vacated remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ - ' . . 
./ 
Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo intervi~w _ Modified to-----
If the · al Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written . . 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. -- . . . 
.J:his Firial Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the ·Parole Board, if any, were inailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, <;>n. ?./Lo/,,1{)')...() . . 
. ~ 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appel.larit's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
· P-2002(B) (11/2018) : 
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant shooting and killing his wife. 
Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to prepare a Transitional Accountability 
Plan (“TAP”); 2) the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to consider 
all factors and “returned to the scene of the crime” instead of focusing on the future; 3) the decision 
violated Appellant’s due process rights by relying primarily on the instant offense without citing 
any aggravating factors, effectively resentencing him, and issuing a predetermined decision; 4) 
Appellant’s record contrasts favorably with other parole applicants; and 5) the 24-month hold was 
excessive.  
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: Appellant’s instant offense of Murder in the second degree; 
Appellant’s criminal record including misdemeanor convictions resulting in conditional 
discharges and a probation sentence which was later revoked; Appellant’s visual impairment; 
Appellant’s institutional efforts including over three dozen disciplinary tickets, completion of ART 
and AVP; and release plans to live with one of his aunts, his godmother, or his cousin, and enroll 
in a vocational retraining program. The Board also had before it and considered, among other 
things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, an official statement from 
the District Attorney from 2017, and Appellant’s parole packet including letters of support. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense representing an escalation of unlawful 
conduct, and Appellant’s poor disciplinary record. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 
N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 
90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 
1997); Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d 
Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013). The Board also cited the COMPAS instrument’s elevated 
score for prison misconduct. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 
100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 
180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 
2017).  
 
The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to “Offender Case Plan.”  The 
existing regulations already refer to and require consideration of the “case plan.”  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(b).  Accordingly, no further regulation is required.  An Offender Case Plan was prepared for 
Appellant and made available to the Board and discussed during the interview. (Tr. at 10-11.) 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board “returned to the scene of the crime” instead of focusing 
on the future is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and 
needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–
c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
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of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the 
COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the 
Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors 
and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board 
conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the 
instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
 
The Board is not precluded from considering or emphasizing an inmate’s criminal behavior on 
a reappearance release interview.  Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 
A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Hawkins v. Travis, 259 
A.D.2d 813, 686 N.Y.S. 2d 198 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed, 93 N.Y.2d 1033, 697 N.Y.S.2d 556 
(1999).  And while the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always required to support 
emphasis on an inmate’s offense, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, the 
Board’s decision here was based on an additional consideration.  
 
There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 
153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. 
of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).  That the Board ultimately 
emphasized Appellant’s offense over other factors does not mean the Board was biased.  See 
Matter of Garcia, 239 A.D.2d at 240, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 418-19.  Appellant has failed to overcome the 
presumptions that the Board acted with honesty and integrity and complied with its duty.  See 
Matter of Fuchino, 255 A.D.2d at 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d at 390; People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  
 
Insofar as Appellant alleges a due process violation, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be 
conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo 
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v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 
737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more 
than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the 
due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
As for allegations about other parole applicants, “[t]here is no entitlement to parole based upon 
comparison with the particulars of other applicants.  Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board 
has full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value.”  Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124-25 (1st Dept. 2007); see also Baker 
v. McCall, 543 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 
Finally, the Board’s decision to hold an inmate for a maximum period of 24 months is within 
the Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that an 18-month hold for discretionary release was excessive or improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
 
 
